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Psychological Warfare, Japan 
Japanese psychological warfare operations were modeled 
on campaigns conducted by the British in World War I 
and rhe Germans in World War II. The Germans estab-




wh1ch resulted m close psychological warfare collabora-
tion berween these rwo Axis powers. As a result, their 
propaganda themes, such as borh nations having divine 
or semidivine rulers and being populated by super races 
whose destiny was to rule rhe world, were strikingly 
parallel. 
Psychological warfare served four general goals of the 
Japanese war effort: to weaken and destroy the morale of 
the Western powers, to encourage the resistance of 
friendly forces in territories occupied by the Western pow-
ers, to promote dissension berween Western government/ 
military forces and their home fronts and allies, and to 
keep neutrals neutral or to procure their active coopera-
tion against the West. The Japanese conducted three gen-
eral forms of psychological warfare, which were primarily 
coordinated by the Cabinet Information Board. However, 
rhe headquarters of the Japanese army remained auton-
omous and conducted its own psychological operations. 
Strategic propaganda was directed against the home 
fronts, political leadership, and status of the Western pow-
ers in Asia. The Japanese had defied these Western powers 
by invading rhe Chinese territory of Manchuria in 1931 
and, as a result, gained a powerful psychological advantage 
over them. They capitalized upon it with the slogan "Asia 
for rhe Asiatics." Although most of the Japanese leader-
ship, both political and military, seemed sincerely to be-
lieve in the slogan's sentiments, it was nonetheless used 
as a pretext for Japan's policy of military expansion. Ja-
pan's intent was to be viewed as rhe liberator of the Asia ric 
peoples and to show that the rule of the Western powers 
in Asia was now over. 
In the decade preceding their surprise anack on Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, the Japanese 
preyed upon rhe split in American public opinion be-
rween isolationists and interventionists to further their 
policies. Ambiguity, threats, and promises of goodwill 
were elevated to an art form. These made possible the 
continued provision of strategic resources such as fuel oil 
and scrap iron ro the Japanese economy, as well as the 
secret fortification of the islands mandated to Japan by 
the League of Nations. 
Operational and tactical propaganda were direcre~ 
against the military forces of the Western powers. In th1s 
regard Pearl Harbor a master stroke at the operational 
level, bur at the same rime it was, was a strategic blunder 
that utterly destroyed ten years of psychological opera-
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tions directed toward the United States. Their belief rhar 
the "decadent" Americans would crumple at the first blow 
and meekly turn over most of the Pacific to Japan shows 
that the Japanese were every bit as "racist" as the 
Americans. 
Operational and tactical Japanese psychological war-
fare included rhe broadcasts made by Radio Tokyo, es-
pecially those of Tokyo Rose, and the dropping of prop-
aganda leaflets . An example of the latter is rhe depiction 
of an Aussie soldier fighting in New Guinea while an 
American soldier ral<es liberties with an Australian girl 
back home. Japanese leaflets directed at U.S. troops in-
variably depicted the Americans clad in World War I-
sryle uniforms, complete with "soup bowl" helmets, 
equipment nor seen in that army since the fall of rhe 
Phi lippines. The iconography was usually Oriental and 
the "English" rexr fractured. American troops eagerly 
gathered such efforts and traded them like baseball or 
bubble-gum cards, nor for their "political" content but 
for their graphic pornography and hilarious texts. Surren-
der appeals ("You will be u·eared in accordance wirh rhe 
principles of Bush do") were unlikely to have much appeal 
to troops who knew about the Baraan death march and 
rhe torture-murders of captured An1ericans on Guadal-
canal. 
Allied naval personnel were amused by Tokyo Rose's 
crocodile tears shed for "rhe poor boys on rhe 
_ _ _
__ , sunk last night by our brave sub-
mariners." The "poor boys," as likely as not, were enjoy-
ing the broadcast aboard rhe warship supposedly resting 
on the bottom. On the other hand, Radio Tokyo broad-
casters, possibly borrowing a leaf from the Germans, did 
have rhe wit to broadcast the latest American popular 
music. Jazz, big band, bebop, jinerbug-rhe latest 
Tommy Dorsey or Glen Miller or Bing Crosby 
recordings-could be heard on Axis radio well before Al-
lied broadcasts disseminated them. Bur U.S. sailors were 
so immune to the political blandishments of rhe likes of 
Tokyo Rose that such enemy broadcasts were actually 
piped through the public address systems of Pacific Fleer 
ships, both for the humor and for the sailors to catch up 
on the Ia rest stateside hits. Japanese tactical psywar against 
Allied troops must be judged a complete failure. Nowhere 
has rhere been such great listenership with so little result. 
Propaganda directed toward conquered Asian peoples 
formed the basis for the creation of Japan's envisioned 
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. All traces of 
former Western rule were to be eliminated in the regions 
rhe Japanese occupied. The Japanese occupiers forbade 
listening to Al lied broadcasts, introduced pro-Japanese 
textbooks, replaced European language courses with Jap-
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anese courses, and trained local proteges for administra-
tive positions. Toward the end of the war such propa-
ganda shifted away from promoting Japanese language 
and culrure co creating feelings of anticolonial national-
ism, in an attempt co prevent the Western powers from 
taking back their former colonies. 
The staged spectacle of the once lordly white rulers 
being forced by their Japanese conquerors co sweep the 
srreets of Singapore was something not co be forgotten by 
Asian nationalists . The Japanese had staged what Com-
munists termed "the propaganda of the deed" ; they had 
completely outfought the British, the French, the Dutch, 
and the Americans in a fair fight, using the most modern 
weapons of Asian manufacture. Even the often bestial be-
havior of occupying Japanese troops could nor obliterate 
such considerations. When rhe colonial powers returned 
in 1945, rhey found a changed Asia that would no longer 
rolerare foreign colonial overlordship. This was the one 
undoubted success of Japanese psychological warfare in 
World War II . 
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Psychological Warfare, U.S. 
Psychological warfare, as defined by the U.S. joint chiefs 
of staff during World War II, consisted of the integrated 
use of all means, moral and physical-other than those 
of recognized military actions-that would rend to de-
stroy the will of the enemy and to damage his political 
and economic capacity; that also would rend to deprive 
the enemy of the support, assistance, or sympathy of his 
allies or associates or neutrals; or that would rend co main-
rain, increase, or acquire the support, assistance, and sym-
pathy of neutrals. By 1944 the broader generic term "psy-
chological warfare," and the older and more specific terms 
"combat propaganda" and "propaganda," had become 
virtually interchangeable. (There was also some feeling 
char "propaganda" had been in bad odor as a result of the 
work of rhe Nazi propaganda chief, Paul Joseph Goebbels 
a man who could give lying a bad name.) ' 
When properly applied, psychological warfare sup-
posedly could bolster morale in one's own forces while so 
undermining an enemy's fighting spirit that collapse could 
occur within the first hours of hostilities. Psychological 
warfare could undermine the enemy's morale and destroy 
irs will to resist, both on the main line of resistance and 
on rhe home front. It could destroy alliances, cause civil 
disorder, divide officers from the enlisted ranks and citi-
zens from their leaders, and create chaos in the enemy's 
homeland. Psychological warfare required less in terms of 
personnel than did traditional armed forces, it could en-
hance the effectiveness of conventional weapons, and it 
could provide the final push to an already demoralized 
enemy. In short, its ad11erents claimed, psychological war-
fare could shorten wars, save both money and lives, and 
decrease rhe overall level of violence. 
Psychological warfare was broadly divided into three 
interdependent classes during World War II: strategic, rae-
tical, and consolidation. Strategic propaganda was di-
rected co enemy and enemy-occupied countries, and had 
rhe double task of undermining the will to resist and sus-
raining rhe morale of those supporting the Allies over the 
long term. Tactical or combat propaganda was conducted 
against enemy forces in the forward areas and sought very 
specific, short-term goals. Consolidation propaganda was 
directed toward civilians in rear areas or areas recently 
occupied by Allied troops, to ensure their cooperation. 
The weapons of psychological warfare were those of 
the civilian media in film, print, or audio form. During 
World War II, the armed forces relied primarily on rhe 
printed leaflet, newspaper, or news sheet. More than eight 
billion leaflets were dropped by aircraft or delivered by 
artillery shells worldwide by the Allied powers, the vast 
majority in Europe. In addition, the Allies used motion 
pictures and still photographs, and broadcast medium-
and shortwave radio programs to the home fronts of their 
enemies. On the tactical level, U.S . military personnel 
conducted frontline radio propaganda programs and used 
loudspeakers and megaphones. Nearly every campaign in 
the Pacific and Asian theaters during World War II wit-
nessed the use of some form of psychological warfare 
waged by either a civilian or a military agency. 
In contrast to Europe, however, the Pacific war rep-
resented a vastly different world for Allied propaganclisrs 
because of the number of operational tl1eaters in the re-
